01507nas a2200145   4500008004100000245004600041210004600087260001800133520105600151653001201207100001901219700001701238700002401255856008201279       2020                        eng d00aAnalyst Information Acquisition via EDGAR0 aAnalyst Information Acquisition via EDGAR  aINFORMSc20203 aWe identify analysts’ information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) server activity to analysts’ brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 24% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts’ attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts’ incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts’ forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts’ use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports.10aFinance1 aGibbons, Brian1 aIliev, Peter1 aKalodimos, Jonathan  u/biblio/analyst-information-acquisition-edgar01926nas a2200157   4500008004100000245008300041210006900124260000900193490000800202520137100210653001201581653001501593100002401608700001901632856011701651       2020                        eng d00aExperimental Shareholder Activism: A Novel Approach to Organizational Research0 aExperimental Shareholder Activism A Novel Approach to Organizati  c20200 v1203 aDecision making processes and consequent policy decisions of top management teams often have tremendous impact on employee careers and wellbeing, but the difficulty of accessing executive decision making has made studying such processes especially difficult. Whereas scholars have often relied on their own professional networks to gather small samples of executives or leveraged proxy measures compiled from publicly-available documents, we propose and demonstrate an alternative approach which we term Experimental Shareholder Activism (ESA). ESA allows researchers to directly study executive leadership via the shareholder proposal process—under Rule 14a-8—by purchasing relatively small amounts of stock in a company, and experimentally manipulating features of shareholder proposals to elicit responses from key stakeholders within the company. This approach allows for the direct examination of executive decision making with the benefit of quasi-experimental design. We describe the method, identify vocational and career-relevant areas of inquiry best suited to ESA, and discuss manipulations readily embedded in shareholder proposals. We then provide a toolkit for scholars interested in studying executive decision making on employee career and Human Resource-related outcomes, and demonstrate the viability of such an approach via a pilot experiment.10aFinance10aManagement1 aKalodimos, Jonathan1 aLeavitt, Keith  u/biblio/experimental-shareholder-activism-novel-approach-organizational-research01154nas a2200145   4500008004100000245008100041210006900122260000900191520062300200653001200823100001900835700001700854700002400871856011300895       2020                        eng d00aGovernance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Access0 aGovernance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives The Case of P  c20203 aWe study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit, and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already well-governed firms.10aFinance1 aBhandari, Tara1 aIliev, Peter1 aKalodimos, Jonathan  u/biblio/governance-changes-through-shareholder-initiatives-case-proxy-access02222nas a2200877   4500008004100000245010300041210006900144260000900213653001200222100001800234700001500252700001400267700001500281700001200296700001400308700001500322700001100337700001500348700001500363700001600378700001400394700001900408700001200427700001300439700001200452700001100464700001300475700001700488700001200505700002000517700001300537700002100550700001400571700001600585700001300601700001200614700001500626700001100641700001900652700002400671700001900695700001500714700001100729700001500740700001600755700001300771700001400784700001600798700001300814700001400827700001500841700001200856700001200868700001700880700001200897700001500909700001700924700001600941700001700957700001900974700001500993700001401008700001301022700001301035700001701048700001601065700001801081700001501099700001501114700001601129700001901145700001701164700001201181700001301193856013801206       2018                        eng d00aMany analysts, one dataset: Making transparent how variations in analytical choices affect results0 aMany analysts one dataset Making transparent how variations in a  c201810aFinance1 aSilberzahn, R1 aUhlmann, E1 aMartin, D1 aAnselmi, P1 aAust, F1 aAwtrey, E1 aBahník, S1 aBai, F1 aBannard, C1 aBonnier, E1 aCarlsson, R1 aCheung, F1 aChristensen, G1 aClay, R1 aCraig, M1 aRosa, A1 aDam, L1 aEvans, M1 aCervantes, I1 aFong, N1 aGamez-Djokic, M1 aGlenz, A1 aGordon-McKeon, S1 aHeaton, T1 aEriksson, K1 aHeene, M1 aMohr, A1 aHögden, F1 aHui, K1 aJohannesson, M1 aKalodimos, Jonathan1 aKaszubowski, E1 aKennedy, D1 aLei, R1 aLindsay, T1 aLiverani, S1 aMadan, C1 aMolden, D1 aMolleman, E1 aMorey, R1 aMulder, L1 aNijstad, B1 aPope, B1 aPope, N1 aPrenoveau, J1 aRink, F1 aRobusto, E1 aRoderique, H1 aSandberg, A1 aSchlueter, E1 aSchönbrodt, F1 aSherman, M1 aSommer, S1 aSotak, K1 aSpain, S1 aSpörlein, C1 aStafford, T1 aStefanutti, L1 aTäuber, S1 aUllrich, J1 aVianello, M1 aWagenmakers, E1 aWitkowiak, M1 aYoon, S1 aNosek, B  u/biblio/many-analysts-one-dataset-making-transparent-how-variations-analytical-choices-affect-results00353nas a2200109   4500008004100000245003800041210003800079260000900117653001200126100002400138856008100162       2017                        eng d00aDisruption in Health Care Markets0 aDisruption in Health Care Markets  c201710aFinance1 aKalodimos, Jonathan  uhttps://businessradio.wharton.upenn.edu/programs/the-business-of-health-care01199nas a2200145   4500008004100000245008800041210006900129260000900198300001200207490000700219520072000226653001200946100002400958856007100982       2017                        eng d00aInternal Governance and Performance: Evidence From When External Discipline is Weak0 aInternal Governance and Performance Evidence From When External   c2017  a193-2160 v433 aThe effect of internal governance on performance is potentially economically significant but may be difficult to identify because of confounding external disciplinary mechanisms and the endogenous choice of internal governance. This study addresses those difficulties by using nonprofit hospitals as an economic environment with muted external disciplinary mechanisms and instrumenting for internal governance using governance spillovers of geographically local public firms. Using patient heart attack survival as a measure of performance, a one standard deviation increase in strength of internal governance reduces the probability of death by 0.89 percentage points after controlling for patient characteristics.10aFinance1 aKalodimos, Jonathan  uhttp://www.sciencedirect.co