00600nas a2200145 4500008004100000245009500041210006900136260000900205653003200214100002600246700001800272700002200290700001600312856012600328 2021 eng d00aRe-examining Constraints And Ventures' Learning: The Case Of Business Accelerator Programs0 aReexamining Constraints And Ventures Learning The Case Of Busine c202110aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aGerasymenko, Violetta1 aCho, Sam, Yul1 aArthurs, Jonathan1 aChoi, Yohan u/biblio/re-examining-constraints-and-ventures-learning-case-business-accelerator-programs01726nas a2200181 4500008004100000245012500041210006900166260000900235300001000244490000800254520104000262653003201302100001601334700001801350700002201368700002001390856013401410 2020 eng d00aCelebrity CEO, Identity Threat, and Impression Management: Impact of Celebrity Status on Corporate Social Responsibility0 aCelebrity CEO Identity Threat and Impression Management Impact o c2020 a69-840 v1113 aIn this study, we examine the impact of CEO celebrity status on the propensity of firms to
engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Integrating identity and impression management
theories, we argue that a firm’s engagement in CSR activities is affected by a celebrity CEO’s
impression management motive to maintain his/her identity and status as a celebrity. We then
explore three boundary conditions under which the effects of celebrity status on CSR may be
strengthened. We find that celebrity CEOs’ engagement in CSR activities as an impression
management tactic increases when uncertainty surrounding a firm’s expected performance is
high, when firm performance is low, and the competitive intensity of the industry is high. The
findings of this study provide useful insights into the specific ways by which celebrity CEOs
attempt to protect their established status and reputation. This paper contributes to various
domains of research concerning CEOs, impression management, and CSR.10aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aLee, Gilsoo1 aCho, Sam, Yul1 aArthurs, Jonathan1 aLee, Eun, Kyung u/biblio/celebrity-ceo-identity-threat-and-impression-management-impact-celebrity-status-corporate00643nas a2200157 4500008004100000245011200041210006900153260000900222300001200231490000700243653003200250100002600282700002200308700001800330856013700348 2020 eng d00aHow and When Investment Horizons Determine Venture Capital Firms' Attention Breadth to Portfolio Companies.0 aHow and When Investment Horizons Determine Venture Capital Firms c2020 a475-5030 v4410aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aGerasymenko, Violetta1 aArthurs, Jonathan1 aCho, Sam, Yul u/biblio/how-and-when-investment-horizons-determine-venture-capital-firms-attention-breadth-portfolio01498nas a2200181 4500008004100000245006400041210006100105260000900166300001200175490000700187520091200194653003201106100001601138700001801154700002201172700002001194856010201214 2019 eng d00aCEO Pay Inequity, CEO-TMT Pay Gap, and Acquisition Premiums0 aCEO Pay Inequity CEOTMT Pay Gap and Acquisition Premiums c2019 a105-1160 v983 aThis study extends previous research on the influence of CEO pay inequity on CEOs' decision-making by examining the relationship in the acquisition context. Focusing on CEOs' compensation vis-à-vis external and internal referents, we find that underpaid CEOs pay higher acquisition premiums and that overpaid CEOs pay lower premiums, although this tendency is reduced as the level of overpayment increases, creating a U-shaped relationship. We further find that the CEO-TMT pay gap moderates the relationship between CEO under-/overpayment and acquisition premiums by adjusting CEOs' perceptions of pay inequity and motivation to restore inequity through their higher or lower sense of self-importance. The findings of this study suggest that CEOs' decision-making is strongly influenced by their framing of gains and losses and the perception of pay inequity
vis-à-vis external and internal referents.10aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aLee, Gilsoo1 aCho, Sam, Yul1 aArthurs, Jonathan1 aLee, Eun, Kyung u/biblio/ceo-pay-inequity-ceo-tmt-pay-gap-and-acquisition-premiums01480nas a2200157 4500008004100000245009800041210006900139260000900208300000900217490000700226520088900233653003201122100001801154700002201172856012801194 2018 eng d00aThe Influence of Alliance Experience on Acquisition Premiums and Post-acquisition Performance0 aInfluence of Alliance Experience on Acquisition Premiums and Pos c2018 a1-100 v883 aThis paper examines the influence of acquirers’ alliance experience on acquisition outcomes. Specifically, we investigate whether or not acquirers with alliance experience pay higher acquisition premiums and achieve improved post-acquisition performance. We also investigate how the impact of acquirers’ alliance experience is contingent on the alliance portfolios of target firms. We find that acquirers with alliance experience pay higher acquisition premiums but lower acquisition premiums when their target firms possess alliance portfolios of greater size or diversity. We also find that such acquirers achieve higher post-acquisition performance when the size of alliance portfolios of target firms is larger. Overall, this study suggests that alliance experience can help acquirers develop organizational knowledge and capabilities, and thus influence acquisition outcomes.10aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aCho, Sam, Yul1 aArthurs, Jonathan u/biblio/influence-alliance-experience-acquisition-premiums-and-post-acquisition-performance01356nas a2200157 4500008004100000245013500041210006900176260000900245300001400254490000700268520071500275653003200990100001801022700002001040856013801060 2017 eng d00aHorizon Problem and Firm Innovation: The Influence of CEO Career Horizon, Exploitation and Exploration on Breakthrough Innovations0 aHorizon Problem and Firm Innovation The Influence of CEO Career c2017 a1801-18090 v463 aBuilding on labor market evaluations and legacy conservation motivation perspectives, we propose a mechanism to explain the relationship between CEO career horizons and breakthrough innovations. Using 10-year panel data from 681 U.S. firms, we find that firms that have a CEO with a short career horizon (measured by CEO age) tend to produce fewer breakthrough innovations. We also find that the relationship between CEO career horizon and breakthrough innovation is partially mediated by R&D spending, and also moderated by organizational learning behavior (exploration vs. exploitation). This study highlights how a CEO’s motivation to protect success in the short term affects the firm’s innovativeness.10aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aCho, Sam, Yul1 aKim, Sang, Kyun u/biblio/horizon-problem-and-firm-innovation-influence-ceo-career-horizon-exploitation-and-exploration00661nas a2200157 4500008004100000245011700041210006900158260002200227653003200249100002200281700001800303700001600321700002000337700001600357856013000373 2017 eng d00aThe Impact of Bankruptcy on Competitors: How Technology Overlap and Diversification Affect Value Redistribution.0 aImpact of Bankruptcy on Competitors How Technology Overlap and D aAtlanta, GAc201710aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aArthurs, Jonathan1 aCho, Sam, Yul1 aChoi, Yohan1 aHemmatian, Iman1 aJoshi, Amol u/biblio/impact-bankruptcy-competitors-how-technology-overlap-and-diversification-affect-value01576nas a2200169 4500008004100000245010200041210006900143260000900212520092600221653003201147100002201179700001801201700001601219700002001235700001601255856013501271 2017 eng d00aImpact of Bankruptcy on Rivals: How Tech Overlap and Diversification Affects Value Redistribution0 aImpact of Bankruptcy on Rivals How Tech Overlap and Diversificat c20173 aPrior research on bankruptcy proposes two potential outcom