01507nas a2200145   4500008004100000245004600041210004600087260001800133520105600151653001201207100001901219700001701238700002401255856008201279       2020                        eng d00aAnalyst Information Acquisition via EDGAR0 aAnalyst Information Acquisition via EDGAR  aINFORMSc20203 aWe identify analysts’ information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) server activity to analysts’ brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 24% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts’ attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts’ incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts’ forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts’ use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports.10aFinance1 aGibbons, Brian1 aIliev, Peter1 aKalodimos, Jonathan  u/biblio/analyst-information-acquisition-edgar01154nas a2200145   4500008004100000245008100041210006900122260000900191520062300200653001200823100001900835700001700854700002400871856011300895       2020                        eng d00aGovernance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Access0 aGovernance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives The Case of P  c20203 aWe study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit, and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already well-governed firms.10aFinance1 aBhandari, Tara1 aIliev, Peter1 aKalodimos, Jonathan  u/biblio/governance-changes-through-shareholder-initiatives-case-proxy-access00529nas a2200133   4500008004100000245008000041210006900121260000900190653001200199100002400211700001900235700001700254856012400271       2017                        eng d00aProgress in Understanding Proxy Access and the Shareholder Proposal Process0 aProgress in Understanding Proxy Access and the Shareholder Propo  c201710aFinance1 aKalodimos, Jonathan1 aBhandari, Tara1 aIliev, Peter  uhttps://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/03/progress-in-understanding-proxy-access-and-the-shareholder-proposal-process/00523nas a2200133   4500008004100000245007600041210006900117260000900186653001200195100002400207700001700231700001900248856012200267       2015                        eng d00aPublic versus Private Provision of Governance: The Case of Proxy Access0 aPublic versus Private Provision of Governance The Case of Proxy   c201510aFinance1 aKalodimos, Jonathan1 aIliev, Peter1 aBhandari, Tara  uhttp://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/10/01/public-versus-private-provision-of-governance-the-case-of-proxy-access/