Faculty
Jonathan Kalodimos
Associate Professor, Harley & Brigitte Smith Fellowship Recipient
Finance

Jonathan Kalodimos

541-737-6027

jonathan.kalodimos@oregonstate.edu

Faculty
Jonathan Kalodimos
Overview
Overview
Publications

Overview

Career Interests

Jonathan Kalodimos, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of finance at the ºÚÁÏÍø¹ÙÍø College of Business.

Prior to joining the faculty at OSU, Dr. Kalodimos was a financial economist at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, where he was lead economist on Dodd Frank Act Section 954, which deals with executive compensation clawbacks.

His research has received multiple citations in the popular press, including the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Bloomberg and the Harvard Business Review.

Dr. Kalodimos completed a Ph.D. in finance at the University of Washington’s Michael G. Foster School of Business in 2014, one year after earning a Master of Science in business administration from the same school. He also holds an MS in finance from the University of Florida’s Hough Graduate School of Business and a Bachelor of Science in physics from Kansas State University.

From 2007 to 2009, Dr. Kalodimos was a real estate capital markets analyst for Wachovia Bank.

Publications

Academic Journal
Finance

“Experimental Shareholder Activism: A Novel Approach to Organizational Researchâ€

Decision making processes and consequent policy decisions of top management teams often have tremendous impact on employee careers and wellbeing, but the difficulty of accessing executive decision making has made studying such processes especially difficult. Whereas scholars have often relied on their own professional networks to gather small samples of executives or leveraged proxy measures compiled from publicly-available documents, we propose and demonstrate an alternative approach which we term Experimental Shareholder Activism (ESA). ESA allows researchers to directly study executive leadership via the shareholder proposal process—under Rule 14a-8—by purchasing relatively small amounts of stock in a company, and experimentally manipulating features of shareholder proposals to elicit responses from key stakeholders within the company. This approach allows for the direct examination of executive decision making with the benefit of quasi-experimental design. We describe the method, identify vocational and career-relevant areas of inquiry best suited to ESA, and discuss manipulations readily embedded in shareholder proposals. We then provide a toolkit for scholars interested in studying executive decision making on employee career and Human Resource-related outcomes, and demonstrate the viability of such an approach via a pilot experiment.
Details

2020 Elsevier Jonathan Kalodimos Keith Leavitt View on:

Academic Journal
Finance

“Governance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Accessâ€

We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit, and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already well-governed firms.
Details

2020 Tara Bhandari Peter Iliev Jonathan Kalodimos View on:

Academic Journal
Finance

“Analyst Information Acquisition via EDGARâ€

We identify analysts’ information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) server activity to analysts’ brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 24% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts’ attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts’ incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts’ forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts’ use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports.
Details

2020 Management Science Brian Gibbons Peter Iliev Jonathan Kalodimos View on:

Academic Journal
Finance

“Many analysts, one dataset: Making transparent how variations in analytical choices affect resultsâ€

Details

2018 Association for Psychological Science R Silberzahn E Uhlmann D Martin P Anselmi F Aust E Awtrey S Bahník F Bai C Bannard E Bonnier R Carlsson F Cheung G Christensen R Clay M Craig A Rosa L Dam M Evans I Cervantes N Fong M Gamez-Djokic A Glenz S Gordon-McKeon T Heaton K Eriksson M Heene A Mohr F Högden K Hui M Johannesson Jonathan Kalodimos E Kaszubowski D Kennedy R Lei T Lindsay S Liverani C Madan D Molden E Molleman R Morey L Mulder B Nijstad B Pope N Pope J Prenoveau F Rink E Robusto H Roderique A Sandberg E Schlueter F Schönbrodt M Sherman S Sommer K Sotak S Spain C Spörlein T Stafford L Stefanutti S Täuber J Ullrich M Vianello E Wagenmakers M Witkowiak S Yoon B Nosek View on:

Academic Journal
Finance

“Internal Governance and Performance: Evidence From When External Discipline is Weakâ€

The effect of internal governance on performance is potentially economically significant but may be difficult to identify because of confounding external disciplinary mechanisms and the endogenous choice of internal governance. This study addresses those difficulties by using nonprofit hospitals as an economic environment with muted external disciplinary mechanisms and instrumenting for internal governance using governance spillovers of geographically local public firms. Using patient heart attack survival as a measure of performance, a one standard deviation increase in strength of internal governance reduces the probability of death by 0.89 percentage points after controlling for patient characteristics.
Details

193-216 pages 2017 Jonathan Kalodimos View on:

Academic Journal
Finance

“Shareholder Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions: Are Appraisal Rights Being Abused?â€

Appraisal rights grant dissenting shareholders in an acquisition the right to petition the court to determine the value of their shares. These rights can protect shareholders from acquisitions below fundamental value or can be abused by opportunistic investors. We examine the use of appraisal rights and find the evidence is most consistent with appraisal rights functioning as recourse when the target firm is sold below fundamental value.
Details

2017 Finance Research Letters Jonathan Kalodimos Clark Lundberg View on: